Hoosung Co., Ltd. (093370) _ Fluorine materials and chemical equipment: how the earnings are actually built
Hoosung Co., Ltd. (093370)
Fluorine materials and chemical equipment: how the earnings are actually built
In the first half of 2026, revenue rose 42.5% and operating profit rose 122.7%. This report follows two questions using only figures taken from the company’s regulatory filings: what produced that improvement, and how much of the profit actually survives down to the parent’s shareholders.
This post is a personal analysis based on publicly available regulatory filings. It does not recommend the purchase or sale of any security and is not investment advice. The author is not a licensed financial investment business entity or a registered investment adviser, and does not provide individual consultations.
All data and figures are drawn from sources believed to be reliable, including Korea’s electronic disclosure system, but their accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed. Estimates reflect the author’s stated assumptions and may differ from actual results; every figure is as of the reference date stated in the text.
The analysis deliberately sets aside short-term market pricing and looks first at the operating business and the direction of its fundamentals.
Investment decisions and their consequences belong to the investor. Loss of principal is possible. This material may not be used as evidence in any determination of legal liability.
Filings and results published after the reference date are not reflected. The author does not hold shares in this company. The author may buy or sell without prior notice after publication.
The author has received no compensation of any kind from the company, from any institution, or from any securities firm in connection with this post — no sponsorship, no writing fee, no IR agency fee.
“The critical analysis in this report is a subjective opinion offered for the public purpose of investors’ right to know and the sharing of information. There is no intent to damage the reputation of any company or to interfere with its business.”
Six lines first
How much survives — about 81% of operating profit leaves through interest, tax and the minority holders of the subsidiary.
Cash — cumulative free cash flow over the last five years −KRW 115.6bn ($84.5m), net debt KRW 261.6bn ($191m), no cash dividend in the last three years.
Sources — Half-year report (2026-08-14) and annual report (2026-03-18). Figures are in Korean won.
Two different businesses inside one company
Hoosung reports in two segments. One is fluorine compounds; the other is the chemical-equipment business run by its subsidiary Hantech. They sell different things, and money reaches them in different ways.
To whom — Samsung Electronics and SK hynix for specialty gases; Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, Carrier, Byucksan, Hyundai Motor and Kia for refrigerants.
How money arrives — repeat purchase. The price is set by market conditions.
To whom — plant engineering and construction firms.
How money arrives — percentage-of-completion after an order is won: revenue is booked as the work progresses.
| Segment | H1 2026 revenue | Share | H1 2026 segment operating profit | Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fluorine compounds | 236,303 ($173m) | 71.7% | 14,478 ($10.6m) | 44.3% |
| Chemical equipment (Hantech) | 93,365 ($68.2m) | 28.3% | 18,232 ($13.3m) | 55.7% |
| Total | 329,668 ($241m) | 100% | 32,710 ($23.9m) | 100% |
How this was measured — Revenue split from the revenue-by-type table in the half-year report (after elimination of intersegment sales). Profit split from segment operating profit, measured against the sum of the two segments. Figures in KRW million.
One thing is worth fixing in mind here. The segment with more revenue is not the segment with more profit. The tailwinds that reach the news — semiconductors, Chinese export controls, electrolyte salts — belong to the fluorine side, yet in H1 2026 it was the chemical-equipment side that earned more. [Interpretation] Reading company-level numbers alone can make the tailwind look larger than it is.
Quoted from the annual report, principal customers — in 2025 a single external customer accounted for 17.3% of company revenue (KRW 81.5bn ($59.5m)). The customer is not named in the filing. [Fact]
Compressed into one line: “It sells fluorine materials — a space narrowed by regulation and by customer qualification — to semiconductor, battery and air-conditioning companies, and build-to-order equipment to plant contractors, earning volume × market price.”
The size of the market is not disclosed
Start with what is missing. There is no market-share table in the periodic reports at all. Neither the company nor the peers chosen for comparison publish a share figure. So the sentence “this company holds X% of the market” cannot appear in this report. [Fact]
What the filings do confirm is three things.
To summarise: the evidence that demand is growing comes from the customers’ filings, but there is no measuring stick in any filing for how much of it becomes this company’s revenue.
The regulation that protects also wrote down an expiry date
Three things make this company hard to replace. All three come with a shelf life.
| Barrier | Basis | What weakens it |
|---|---|---|
| Purification technology | Refining anhydrous hydrogen fluoride to semiconductor grade. Two domestic and two overseas patents related to localising ultra-high-purity HF. [Company] | When demand migrates to next-generation materials (HFO-type refrigerants, solid electrolytes). |
| Customer qualification | Semiconductor gases must pass the customer’s qualification before a supplier can be changed, which makes switching slow. [Fact] | This is an industry-wide threshold rather than an advantage unique to Hoosung. The half-year report lists “early qualification with domestic customers” as one of the company’s own sales objectives — Hoosung also has to win approvals. |
| Refrigerant manufacturing licence | Korea’s Act on the Regulation of Manufacturing of Specific Substances for the Protection of the Ozone Layer — Article 4 (manufacturing licence), Article 9 (annual production quantity permit), Article 3 (published baseline limits). Verified against the statute. [Fact] | The same regulation also set the 2030 phase-out schedule for K-22. The shield and the expiry date come from the same law. |
On competitive structure, domestic semiconductor specialty gas is a narrow oligopoly — an April 2026 article named SK specialty and Hoosung as the two domestic substitutes for Japanese WF₆ [Press]. The listed peers identifiable from annual reports are Wonik Materials (largest product group 66.32% of revenue) and TEMC (entirely semiconductor specialty gases) [Fact — each company’s 2025 annual report]. In refrigerants and LiPF₆, Hoosung is the sole domestic producer. Relative position therefore differs by material: ahead in refrigerants and LiPF₆, mid-pack in specialty gases, and for chemical equipment no comparable peer could be identified.
There are three substitutes. LiPF₆ can be replaced by Chinese product (the US FEOC rule is what currently blocks it); refrigerants are being displaced as HFO-type materials push K-22 out; specialty gases have Japanese and Chinese alternatives. [Interpretation] The larger risk is not a competitor but substitutes and regulatory timetables.
Four tailwinds — one of them cuts both ways
In February 2025 China designated tungsten a strategic mineral and introduced an export licence regime. An April 2026 article reported that Japanese WF₆ suppliers had told Korean semiconductor customers they could not guarantee second-half supply and asked them to find domestic alternatives [Press — TheElec 2026-04-03]; a June 2026 article reported that two Japanese companies, together about 25% of world supply, said they would permanently stop WF₆ production from 1 July 2026 [Press — HuffPost Korea 2026-06-21]. Earlier, in October 2025, WF₆ suppliers were reported to have notified Korean customers of price increases of 70–90% [Press — TheElec 2025-10-23].
⚠ All three items above are press reports and are not facts confirmed by any company filing. The rise in selling price is confirmed by the company’s own price-trend table (KRW 14,104 ($10.31) in 2024 → KRW 28,736 ($21.00)/kg in H1 2026), but connecting that rise to these events is this report’s interpretation.
The other side — WF₆ is made by buying Chinese tungsten powder and reacting and purifying it with fluorine. About 80% of that powder is supplied by China [Press — three reports agree]. The very fact that lifts the selling price also ties up the raw material. Hoosung’s own tungsten sourcing could not be found in the annual report — the raw-material table is disclosed as a single line, “fluorite and others”.
Worth noting — the party reportedly cutting Japanese supply and the partner in this venture are the same company. Competitor and partner at once.
Price made it, not volume
Separating the cause of an earnings improvement is simple: look at how much was sold (Q) and at what price (P), separately. The disclosed figures lean heavily to one side.
| Non-consolidated basis, KRW/kg | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Selling price | 14,104 ($10.31) | 17,324 ($12.66) | 28,736 ($21.00) |
| Raw material unit cost | 2,526 ($1.85) | 2,663 ($1.95) | 4,435 ($3.24) |
| Spread | 11,578 ($8.46) | 14,661 ($10.71) | 24,301 ($17.76) |
The selling price is roughly double the 2024 level. Over the same period capacity moved from 24,080 to 24,130 tonnes — essentially unchanged — and the utilisation rate rose only from 32.2% to 35%. In other words this improvement came not from selling more but from selling at a higher price. [Fact]
Can the company set that price? Section “Sales methods and terms” of the half-year report contains only two lines for both domestic and export sales — “cash and credit sales” — with no description of any price-adjustment clause. The section on order status states that the company does enter supply agreements with customers but does not separately disclose order volume or backlog because volumes move with demand. [Fact] What is established is that there is no evidence in the filings that the company sets the price — not that an inability to set it has been proven. Contract terms are not, in any case, subject to mandatory disclosure. [Interpretation]
| Quarter | Revenue | Operating profit |
|---|---|---|
| Q3 2024 | 106,874 ($78.1m) | −1,797 (−$1.3m) |
| Q4 2024 | 110,421 ($80.7m) | −2,599 (−$1.9m) |
| Q1 2025 | 107,117 ($78.3m) | −105 (−$77k) |
| Q2 2025 | 124,207 ($90.8m) | 14,768 ($10.8m) |
| Q3 2025 | 120,987 ($88.4m) | 5,837 ($4.3m) |
| Q4 2025 | 119,254 ($87.1m) | 4,850 ($3.5m) |
| Q1 2026 | 141,446 ($103m) | 9,262 ($6.8m) |
| Q2 2026 | 188,222 ($138m) | 23,399 ($17.1m) |
How this was measured — Q3 and Q1 figures are taken from the quarterly reports as filed; Q2 and Q4 are derived by subtraction (half-year minus Q1; full year minus the nine-month cumulative). Check: 141,446 + 188,222 = 329,668 for H1 2026. Figures in KRW million.
One more thing stands out — the H1 2026 result is concentrated in the second quarter. Operating profit was KRW 9.3bn ($6.8m) in Q1 and KRW 23.4bn ($17.1m) in Q2. Looking at the half-year average effectively stretches one quarter’s strength across two. [Interpretation]
About eight-tenths of operating profit leaves through three doors
Operating profit is what the business earns from its own operations. To become the parent shareholders’ money — profit attributable to owners of the parent — it must pass three tolls: interest, tax, and the share of subsidiary profit that belongs to other people. The table below cuts it in that order.
| FY2026 estimate, KRW million | Amount | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Operating profit | 65,340 ($47.7m) | — |
| Financial income and expense, net | −13,282 (−$9.7m) | interest and related items |
| Pre-tax profit | 52,058 ($38.0m) | — |
| Income tax | −33,057 (−$24.2m) | effective tax rate 63.5% |
| Net profit | 19,001 ($13.9m) | — |
| Non-controlling interests | −6,726 (−$4.9m) | 35.4% of net profit |
| Profit attributable to owners of the parent | 12,275 ($9.0m) | about 19% of operating profit |
Of KRW 65.3bn ($47.7m) in operating profit, KRW 12.3bn ($9.0m) — roughly 19% remains for the parent’s shareholders. The other 81% goes to three places. All three ratios are taken from recent actual figures.
For a long stretch, more cash went out than came in
Profit is a number in the books; cash flow is money that actually moved. Cash generated by operations (OCF) minus cash spent on facilities (capex) gives free cash flow (FCF).
| KRW million | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 83,447 ($61.0m) | 94,333 ($68.9m) | −5,841 (−$4.3m) | 75,638 ($55.3m) | 39,576 ($28.9m) | −8,683 (−$6.3m) |
| Capital expenditure | 59,150 ($43.2m) | 117,733 ($86.0m) | 106,119 ($77.5m) | 80,540 ($58.8m) | 39,218 ($28.7m) | 15,866 ($11.6m) |
| Free cash flow | +24,297 ($17.8m) | −23,400 (−$17.1m) | −111,960 (−$81.8m) | −4,902 (−$3.6m) | +358 ($262k) | −24,549 (−$17.9m) |
Five-year total, 2021–2025 — operating cash flow 287,152 ($210m) · capital expenditure 402,759 ($294m) · cumulative free cash flow −115,607 (−$84.5m) (KRW million).
Free cash flow was positive through 2021. KRW 135.4bn ($98.9m) drained out across the two expansion years of 2022–2023; 2024 and 2025 came close to balance; and H1 2026 shows another KRW 24.5bn ($17.9m) outflow. Adding up the five years from 2021 to 2025, the company spent KRW 115.6bn ($84.5m) more than it earned. [Fact — consolidated statement of cash flows]
How this was measured — Capital expenditure here is the sum of acquisitions of property, plant and equipment, intangible assets and right-of-use assets (gross acquisitions, not netted against disposals). Narrowed to PP&E acquisitions alone, 2023 becomes 105,094 and 2025 becomes 39,148, with the five-year total reduced accordingly. The H1 2026 column uses the PP&E-acquisition basis only, so its measuring stick differs from the five preceding years.
Why operating cash flow turned negative in H1 2026 — this has been accounted for. Half-year net profit of KRW 17.7bn ($12.9m) plus KRW 46.0bn ($33.6m) of non-cash charges such as depreciation gives KRW 63.7bn ($46.5m). But working capital absorbed KRW 67.5bn ($49.3m): trade receivables −KRW 33.8bn ($24.7m), inventories −KRW 25.1bn ($18.3m), contract assets −KRW 14.7bn ($10.7m), trade payables +KRW 11.8bn ($8.6m) and other items. As revenue grew 42.5%, money owed to the company and inventory on hand swelled with it — a common pattern in a growth phase. [Interpretation]
That said, the concern does not disappear — the increase in inventory is product not yet sold, and the cumulative impairment loss on contract assets rose from KRW 1.58bn ($1.2m) to KRW 3.43bn ($2.5m), a factor of 2.18. That means a larger portion of construction revenue already recognised is now of uncertain collectability. [Fact — note 28]
Completed April 2024; the capacity table moved by 50 tonnes
The company stated that it completed a 2,000-tonne LiPF₆ line in Ulsan in April 2024, and subsequent reports describe it as “trial run completed”. Yet the capacity table in the periodic reports moved from 24,080 tonnes in 2025 to 24,130 tonnes annualised at the 2026 half-year — the 2,000 tonnes are not reflected. [Fact — annual report cross-checked against half-year report]
| Capacity, base fluorine compounds | Figure |
|---|---|
| 2025 annual report | 24,080 t |
| H1 2026 report (annualised) | 24,130 t |
| Difference | +50 t |
Why this matters: the capital expenditure of 2022–2023 (KRW 223.9bn ($164m) over two years) has already left as cash. There is not yet a filing that confirms that investment coming back as revenue and profit. Whether recovery is late or this is simply a timing difference in how capacity is recorded will be settled by the capacity table in the next report. [Interpretation]
The other side — an April 2026 domestic article reported that the existing 2,000-tonne line entered full operation from the second quarter and that a new 2,000-tonne line, having completed performance improvements, is due to start up within the year. If that is so, the absence from the capacity table is a recording lag rather than a failed recovery. [Press — Tokenpost 2026-04-23 · not confirmed by any filing and not reflected in this report’s estimates]
The backlog grew; the speed of working it off slowed
| Chemical-equipment backlog, KRW million | Figure |
|---|---|
| Opening balance, H1 2025 | 126,464 ($92.4m) |
| Opening balance, H1 2026 | 155,118 ($113m) |
| Closing balance, H1 2026 | 165,804 ($121m) |
| New orders, H1 2026 | 103,449 ($75.6m) (+9.3%) |
| Backlog change year on year | +19.8% |
| Backlog conversion rate, H1 2025 → H1 2026 | 65.4% → 59.8% (−5.58pp) |
How this was measured — Backlog conversion rate = construction revenue recognised ÷ opening contract backlog.
More work has been booked, but the speed at which it turns into revenue has slowed. Arithmetically, though, the backlog itself is now larger, so even at the slower rate second-half construction revenue exceeds the first half (KRW 99.2bn ($72.5m) versus KRW 92.8bn ($67.8m)). The delay looks less like a loss of total volume and more like a shift between years. [Interpretation]
Financial structure — four things to note
| Item | What the filings show |
|---|---|
| Debt maturities | At the end of June 2026, total borrowings of about KRW 330.2bn ($241m) (short-term 127.8 · current portion of long-term 50.8 · long-term 113.3 · convertible bonds 24.8 · exchangeable bonds 13.6), cash of KRW 68.6bn ($50.1m), net debt of about KRW 261.6bn ($191m). About 58% matures within one year (approximate, because the current/non-current classification of the exchangeable bonds could not be confirmed). |
| Convertible bonds | Issued 2025-10-23, KRW 27.0bn ($19.7m), maturing 2030-11-05. On conversion, 3,937,582 new shares would be created, equal to 3.54% of shares outstanding. Conversion may be requested from 5 November 2026. [Fact] |
| Exchangeable bonds — already partly executed | Issued 2025-12-15, KRW 50.0bn ($36.5m), exchangeable into shares of the subsidiary Hantech. As disclosed on 2026-03-24, KRW 24.0bn ($17.5m) had already been exchanged, moving 629,095 Hantech shares (5.66% of Hantech’s total) outside the group; the remaining KRW 26.0bn ($19.0m) is still within its exercise period. The direction is a shrinking stake in the subsidiary that earns the larger profit. [Fact] |
| Shareholder returns and governance | No cash dividend recorded for the last three years. The subsidiary Hantech, by contrast, resolved a cash and in-kind dividend disclosed on 2026-02-25. Compliance with the corporate governance key indicators stands at 53.3%; separation of the board chair from the CEO, cumulative voting, and a dedicated audit department are not adopted. [Fact] |
Half of 2026 is already fixed by reported figures
Before reading the estimate — the figures below are assembled mechanically from reported filings. They are not company guidance. Every assumption used is stated here. No target price, fair value or investment opinion is calculated or presented.
| Assumption | Basis |
|---|---|
| Revenue | H1 2026 segment actuals × 2. Because the first half is already reported, half of the year is actual. Seasonality (H2 2025 was 3.9% larger than H1 2025) is not applied — applying it would add about KRW 12.7bn ($9.3m), so the omission is conservative. |
| Cost | Cost of sales ratio 79.97%, SG&A ratio 10.12% (both H1 2026 actuals). The three leaks below operating profit use exactly the ratios in section 07. |
One limitation of this assembly — because cost of sales and SG&A are held as a fixed percentage of revenue, margins stay flat as revenue grows. In real manufacturing there are fixed costs, so margins rise faster when revenue grows and fall faster when it shrinks; that amplification has disappeared from this table. There was no volume data with which to separate fixed from variable cost. Depreciation actually rose 18.1% year on year in H1 2026 (KRW 21.89bn ($16.0m) → KRW 25.85bn ($18.9m)). [Interpretation — a limit of the method]
Why 2027 and beyond are not set out — not because things will not improve, but because there is no basis in the filings for extending the numbers. There are zero capacity-expansion disclosures, and no filing breaks out volume by product, so no volume axis can be built.
What is excluded — the Central Glass joint venture (zero filings), start-up of the new LiPF₆ line (absent from the capacity table), and one-off gains and losses (the sign has been inconsistent across the last three years, so they are set to zero for the future).
Shaken up and down — the downside is larger than the upside
| Path | Revenue | Operating profit | Profit attributable to parent | vs base |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — supply constraint lasts another year | 716,016 ($523m) | 70,957 ($51.8m) | 13,599 ($9.9m) | +10.8% |
| Base | 659,336 ($482m) | 65,340 ($47.7m) | 12,275 ($9.0m) | — |
| Bear — second half falls back to Q1 levels | 612,560 ($448m) | 50,261 ($36.7m) | 8,719 ($6.4m) | −29.0% |
On profit, the downside is 2.7 times the upside. The conditions differ in character as well: the three premises of the bull path are futures not yet confirmed by any filing (two of them rest on decisions by the Chinese and US governments), while the bear path is an extension of already observed Q1 2026 actuals.
The other side, stated too — even the bear path is +29.9% on 2025 revenue. Because the first half is already fixed, there is little room to fall within calendar 2026 itself. The place where variance opens up is 2027 and beyond, and the reason that stretch currently sits flat at “zero increment” is the one given above.
Set out in four boxes
- Semiconductor-grade purification of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride, with 40 years of handling history
- Refrigerant manufacturing licence — the statute narrows new entry
- Sole domestic producer of LiPF₆ and of certain refrigerants
- Chemical-equipment backlog of KRW 165.8bn ($121m) (+19.8%) gives a predictable slice of revenue
- No evidence in the filings that the company sets its own selling price
- About 81% of operating profit leaks to interest, tax and non-controlling interests
- Cumulative five-year free cash flow −KRW 115.6bn ($84.5m); net debt about KRW 261.6bn ($191m)
- Utilisation of 35% — plant is idle, and capacity additions have stalled
- No product/merchandise breakdown, so volume and price cannot be separated
- Chinese tungsten controls and reduced Japanese supply create a window for domestic substitution
- The FEOC rule concentrates demand on non-Chinese lithium salt
- Downstream fab expansion (KRW 60tn ($43.8bn) across the three disclosed projects alone)
- Room for the purification technology to migrate to next-generation materials (HFO refrigerants, solid electrolytes) [zero filing trace — a possibility only]
- If China eases licensing or Japan resumes supply, the selling price falls first
- The same regulation fixed a 2030 expiry for K-22 capacity
- Raw material (Chinese tungsten powder) sourcing is tied to the same root as the tailwind
- Convertible and exchangeable bonds point toward dilution of equity and of the subsidiary stake
- Cumulative impairment on contract assets up 2.18×
Four questions are still open
What this report could not answer is written down as it stands. All four are open because the company has not yet broken them out in its filings, and none has been filled in with an estimate.
| # | Open question | When it gets answered |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Ulsan expansion completed two years ago is not confirmed as being in commercial operation. The June 2026 half-year report still says “trial run completed”, and capacity moved 24,080 → 24,130 tonnes. | 2026-11-16 Q3 report |
| 2 | The effective tax rate has only two observations. The 2026 profit estimate rests on 63.5% (the 2025 actual), while H1 2026 was 48.4%; which level persists is unconfirmed. | 2027-03-31 Annual report |
| 3 | There is no material with which to separate volume from price. The company does not split product from merchandise, so no volume axis can be built and no basis exists for extending numbers into 2027. | 2027-03-31 Annual report |
| 4 | Where the lithium salt is made and sold is not broken out. Without a split between Ulsan and Nantong, China, whether the FEOC rule helps or excludes the company cannot be decided. | 2027-03-31 Annual report |
The four tend to resolve upward — if 1, 2 and 3 are confirmed, the profit estimate has room to rise. How much, however, cannot be measured with the material available, so no size is given. Only the direction is stated. [Interpretation]
When, and in which document, it will be decided
Every item below is verifiable in a filed document, and each has a stated document and month in which it turns. Words without a time attached — “soon”, “eventually” — are not used.
| Signal, in factual language | Direction | Where and when |
|---|---|---|
| The Ulsan 2,000-tonne lithium-salt line appears in the capacity table, or the start of commercial operation is disclosed | Recovery confirmed | Q3 report 2026-11-16 |
| Utilisation of base fluorine compounds rises above 40% or falls below 30% | Either way | Half-year and annual reports twice a year |
| The consolidated effective tax rate falls below 50% at a third observation | Leak narrows | Annual report 2027-03-31 |
| Revenue is broken out by product/merchandise, by item, or by production site | Uncertainty resolved | Annual report 2027-03-31 |
| China announces an easing of tungsten export controls, or Japanese producers announce a resumption of supply | Price gives back | China MOFCOM notice as it occurs |
| An equity investment, facility investment or supply contract related to the Central Glass venture is filed | Report becomes fact | DART as it occurs |
| The chemical-equipment contract backlog falls for two consecutive quarters | Work shrinking | Quarterly reports quarterly |
| A conversion request on the convertible bonds, or a further exchange of the remaining KRW 26.0bn ($19.0m) of exchangeable bonds, is disclosed | Dilution | DART after 2026-11-05 |
The date 2026-11-16 is used because the statutory filing deadline for the Q3 report (11-14) falls on a Saturday, moving it to the next business day.
Material from press sources is tagged [Press] because it is not confirmed by any filing, and none of it is reflected in the estimates. No brokerage target price, investment opinion or earnings forecast is cited anywhere. Reported multiples for the rise in the tungsten price differ widely by source (an October 2025 report said about 95% since the start of that year; online commentary said six to seven times), so only the direction is adopted and no multiple is shown. The six press items above are cited without original links — only the outlet name and publication date are given, which means readers cannot easily verify the basis of the citation directly.
Unless otherwise stated, table figures are in KRW million, with the author’s dollar conversion shown in parentheses at the single rate noted above. Amounts expressed in the running text as “bn” are rounded for readability; the tables carry the precise figures. This English edition is a condensed counterpart of the Korean report of the same reference date; where the two differ in wording, the Korean edition governs.
댓글
댓글 쓰기