DUCHEM BIO _ A monopoly built by half-life — with the price tag held by the government
A monopoly built by half-life — with the price tag held by the government
Korea's leading maker of diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals produces at 12 in-hospital sites and ships the same day.
There are now two growth engines instead of one and all 12 production sites survived — but FDG, half of revenue, has stalled; much of the margin gain is a lease-capitalisation accounting shift; and no cash has ever reached shareholders.
51.9% of revenue. KRW 22.02bn in 2025 → 21.67bn annualised in 2026. The core gives back what the two new engines add.
Three-year cumulative FCF ÷ net income is 118.0% — a pass. Deduct KRW 8.18bn of lease principal, the real cost of the hospital sites, and it falls to a borderline 73.7%.
No dividend, no buyback cancellation, no FY2025 year-end dividend. Net cash of KRW 13.16bn sits on the balance sheet with no route out.
The business — what protects it is distance, not technology
The company makes eight radiopharmaceuticals and sells them to Korea's large hospitals. Three layers do the work: the physics of a short half-life (make today, deliver today), 12 GMP production sites located inside hospital buildings, and a distribution licence that combines radioactive-material handling with pharmaceutical wholesale.
PET (positron emission tomography) injects a tiny amount of radioactive tracer and photographs where it collects. What this company sells is the tracer.
Customers buy here because the supplier is close, not because nothing else exists. One delivery vehicle can physically cover two or three hospitals, and the carrier needs both licences at once. Money alone does not clear that bar.
Contracts typically run a year or more. Two customers above the 10% threshold account for 29.5% of revenue (16.7% and 12.8%) — but their names are not disclosed, so there is no public basis for judging whether that concentration is a risk or a source of stability.
IN ONE PARAGRAPH It sells short half-life diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals to large hospitals, earning its money through repeat delivery from 12 in-hospital sites that make the product and ship it the same day.
Revenue mix · H1 2026 actual
| Product | Share | Character |
|---|---|---|
| FDG | 51.9% | Cancer imaging. Both procedure and drug reimbursed; a mature market. |
| Alzheimer's tracers | 21.8% | Vizamyl, Neuraceq. H1 KRW 4.55bn (+38.2%); not reimbursed. |
| FP-CIT | 10.2% | Parkinson's imaging. Procedure reimbursed, drug not. |
| Prostacyc | 3.5% | Prostate cancer. KRW 0.026bn in 2025 → 0.723bn in H1 2026. |
| Merchandise / other | 12.6% | Contrast agents, cassettes, equipment leasing. |
FES (breast cancer) was approved on 18 Dec 2025 but does not appear in the product revenue table — sales have not started. Source: H1 report filed 14 Aug 2026 (no. 20260814002701); material management disclosure 18 Dec 2025 (no. 20251218900498).
Market — two engines running, and the plant is already full
The market is real: KRW 19.49bn of radiopharmaceuticals changed hands in H1 2026 alone. Domestic market size of roughly USD 108m (2023) and 11.2% annual growth to 2033 are figures the company cites from third-party research, not its own disclosed sizing — treated here as interpretation, not fact.
Two engines are actually running. Alzheimer's tracers reached KRW 4.55bn in the half, up 38.2%, and Prostacyc went from KRW 0.026bn in 2025 to 0.723bn in H1 2026. Both are measured. But the dementia growth sits on out-of-pocket demand, so it can bend once the population able to self-pay is exhausted.
| Engine | What / size | Timing | Company claim or outside fact? |
|---|---|---|---|
| ① | Dementia tracers — H1 KRW 4.55bn (+38.2%), ~25% of product revenue · large | Running | Outside fact — product revenue in the H1 report |
| ② | Prostacyc — KRW 0.026bn → 0.723bn · medium | Running (stepped up in 2026) | Outside fact — product revenue in the H1 report |
| ③ | Therapeutic radiopharmaceutical CDMO — KRW 50bn planned investment · size unknown | Not started (commercial output targeted 2030) | Company claim — not even a site has been disclosed |
A licensed imaging-AI technology that shortens scan waiting time would help volumes, but a subsidiary licensed it rather than developing it, and the revenue path is still a plan. It is counted once on the market side and adds nothing to the moat.
The ceiling is physical
Capacity fell from 4,482 batches in 2023 to 3,690 in 2025 while utilisation climbed to 94.4%. The company gives no reason for the decline, and the stated formula ("3 batches per centre per day × business days") is identical across three reports, so a change of method is unlikely.
| 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capacity (batches) | 4,482 | 4,446 | 3,690 | 1,800 |
| Utilisation | 83.8% | 75.3% | 86.6% | 94.4% |
Capex was KRW 1.15bn → 1.59bn → 0.87bn, and 0.149bn in H1 2026 — three and a half years without an expansion.
The moat — downgraded to "moderate × moderate"
Share is high: amyloid PET 94.8%, F-DOPA 100%, FDG 58.2%, FP-CIT 52.0% (2024 production statistics). But the substance of it is contracts on someone else's land — the 12 sites are tenancies inside hospitals — and manufacturing on someone else's molecule, since the cassettes and cold kits for both dementia tracers come from external originators. Only one year of evidence supports "it holds". In the same table, hospital in-house production moved 26 percentage points in a single year (28.2% → 2.0%).
The structure is an oligopoly of one to three real competitors, with three barriers stacked: half-life (physics), in-hospital siting (location), GMP and product approval (regulation).
| Competitor | Strength / position | Share (2024 production · trend) |
|---|---|---|
| FutureChem (listed) | The only head-on rival across the range; funded by an equity raise; launched a prostate cancer tracer. Behind — near-parity in FP-CIT. Already through the same regulatory barrier. | FDG 12.9% ↑ · FP-CIT 48.0% ↑ · dementia 5.2% → |
| HDX (private) | FDG specialist, owns production sites. Behind. | FDG 6.0% → |
| Kai Biotech (private) / hospital in-house | Self-supply of their own volume, limited to licensed hospitals. Behind. | Kai 0.8% ↓ · hospital in-house 2.0% ↓↓ (28.2% in 2023) |
The competitive position is hardening: as hospitals exit in-house production the volume moves to specialists, and dementia share rose three years running (93.4% → 94.3% → 94.8%). FP-CIT is the exception, slipping from 55.8% to 52.0%.
The dangerous thing is not a competitor but a substitute — a blood test for Alzheimer's. A quarter of revenue rides on one engine, and this is a cheaper, less invasive method aimed precisely at that engine.
Environment: strong → moderate. The growth is measured and real, but every path that would make it much larger is still shut. Leqembi reimbursement did not appear on the agenda of the 4th, 6th or 7th 2026 drug reimbursement committee meetings; CDMO commercial production is targeted for 2030; overseas sales were 0.8% of the half. The substitute-technology clock, meanwhile, is already ticking.
Re-tested, the verdict stands. Lease maturity concentration (45.8% of nominal lease payments fall due within a year) reinforces the "someone else's land" problem, while KRW 10.21bn of new right-of-use building assets recognised in 2025 shows renewals actually happening. The two facts point opposite ways and largely cancel.
What would weaken the moat: a hospital refusing to renew a site lease or sharply raising rent, and a blood test displacing amyloid PET at the front of the pathway.
The numbers — revenue up, shareholder profit down
2026 is built from measured H1 (KRW 20.90bn) with H2 carried over from the same half last year. 2027–28 are held flat for lack of new evidence — growth is set to zero, which is not the same as saying there will be none.
| KRW 100m | 2023 | 2024 | 2025A | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 346.9 | 356.0 | 385.7 | 422.1 | 422.1 | 422.1 |
| Operating profit | 52.6 | 50.8 | 74.4 | 82.5 | 83.1 | 83.1 |
| Operating margin | 15.2% | 14.3% | 19.3% | 19.5% | 19.7% | 19.7% |
| Pre-tax profit | — | 55.6 | 66.6 | 71.8 | 71.7 | 71.7 |
| Net profit to owners | 40.0 | 79.9 | 64.8 | 55.6 | 55.6 | 55.6 |
| Effective tax rate | 1.3% | −43.7% | 2.65% | 22.5% | 22.5% | 22.5% |
| Free cash flow | 72.9 | 54.4 | 90.7 | 114.9 | 114.9 | 114.9 |
| FCF after lease principal | — | — | 58.5 | 64.6 | 64.6 | 64.6 |
2026E revenue = measured H1 20.901bn + H2 21.306bn (prior-year half carried forward, with Prostacyc replaced by the latest half, +0.697bn). By product: dementia 8.76bn (+16.8%), Prostacyc 1.45bn, FDG 21.67bn (annualised), everything else 32.00bn.
Two lines need a note. Operating profit is KRW 0.06bn higher in 2027–28 than in 2026 — not from growth, but because a one-off receivable impairment booked in 2026 is set to zero afterwards; revenue is identical across the three years. And 2024 net profit to owners (7.99bn) exceeds pre-tax profit (5.56bn), because deferred tax assets were recognised that year and tax was negative — the −43.7% effective rate is the mark it left.
Quality of earnings — nothing got worse, things moved
Lease capitalisation. During 2025 the hospital tenancies shifted from variable rent to fixed leases and were capitalised. In the measured half, rent expense fell from KRW 2.227bn to 0.073bn, depreciation rose from 2.441bn to 4.284bn, and interest expense from 0.433bn to 0.729bn. The same rent simply moved out of operating costs into depreciation and interest: operating profit looks better, non-operating looks worse. Total lease cash outflow is about KRW 7.7bn a year — 18% of revenue — of which roughly 5.0bn of principal sits outside operating profit, in financing. That is why three-year cash conversion splits into 118.0% (pass) and 73.7% (borderline).
The tax shield is running out. The company said so itself: the 2025 fall in net profit was "a decrease in net income due to higher corporate tax" (disclosure of 30%+ change in earnings structure, 29 Jan 2026, no. 20260129900282). The business did not deteriorate; loss carryforwards are being used up and the rate is returning to normal. The direction is not settled in one way only — the H1 2025 rate was also 20.17%, yet the full year came to 2.65% after a year-end deferred tax asset recognition (−0.728bn), and KRW 30.98bn of unrecognised carryforwards remain. Because year-end recognition has happened twice, short of the three-consecutive-year rule, it is not reflected here and 22.5% stands — logged instead as a risk that profit comes in higher than modelled.
The range — the upside needs three things to land, the downside needs only continuation
All three cases are stated on the final year (2028). Only the variable lines differ (product revenue, cost ratio, SG&A ratio); the stable ones (net financial, minority, tax rate) are shared.
| Case | To owners | Revenue / op. profit | What the company becomes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bull | 71 | 523 / 103 | Dementia compounds at 38% for two more years, Prostacyc doubles and FES adds 7 — the two engines outrun the stalled core. Margins inherited from the base case. |
| Base | 56 | 422 / 83 | Measured figures carried forward, Prostacyc held flat with no growth added. Revenue rises while the shareholder's share falls on tax. |
| Bear | 37 | 410 / 59 | FDG and merchandise keep shrinking, cost ratio 66.0% and SG&A 19.7% (the unfavourable end of the measured band) — 12 sites still carried, thinner profit. |
- +27% upside requires three unconfirmed premises: reimbursement opens, capacity is added, the blood test fails to displace PET.
- −34% downside requires only the continuation of facts already in motion: FDG stagnation, raw material inflation (O-18 +21.9%), no evidence of price pass-through.
Where this view is most likely wrong. If the downward tilt is mistaken, the likeliest route is Prostacyc: a product that has already risen 28-fold without drug reimbursement is held at zero growth in the base case. If that suppression is excessive, the tilt is far shallower.
Shown separately: a stress case in which a domestic p-tau217 blood test cuts the dementia segment by 30% gives 383 / 55 / 34. With zero measured evidence on domestic timing or substitution rate, this is flagged as a "reduction with no fact behind it" and shown alongside only.
Six questions — the substance of the conclusion
| Question | What is established | Judgement | Signal to watch |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is H2 margin really better? | H2 2025 operating margin 23.71% vs H1 14.23% — a single observation. | Interpretation · neutral — that one point carries 61% of forecast 2026 operating profit. | Q3 report · mid-Nov 2026 |
| The core has stalled | FDG KRW 22.02bn (2025) → 10.84bn in H1 2026 (21.67bn annualised, −1.6%). | Fact · negative — the two engines grow, the core gives it back. | Product revenue · Nov 2026 / Mar 2027 |
| Nature of the margin gain | Rent 2.23 → 0.07bn, depreciation 2.44 → 4.28bn, interest 0.43 → 0.73bn (measured half). | Fact · neutral — a change of location in the accounts, not deterioration. | Lease repayment in cash flow statement · Mar 2027 |
| A new product that did not wait for reimbursement | Prostacyc KRW 0.026bn → 0.723bn with no drug reimbursement; southern supply network completed 4 Aug 2026. | Fact · positive — the "nothing grows before reimbursement" frame broke once here. | Quarterly Prostacyc revenue · Nov 2026 |
| The blood test | FDA cleared Roche's Elecsys pTau217 on 24 Aug 2026 — a single-biomarker blood test usable in primary care. | Interpretation · negative, but double-edged — clinicians frame it as triage feeding PET; if the rule-outs dominate, PET volumes fall. | MFDS approval listing · ongoing |
| Does the money reach shareholders? | No dividend, no cancellation, no FY2025 year-end dividend; the dividend policy is stated as an intention. | Fact · negative — KRW 13.16bn of net cash with no route out. | Year-end dividend resolution · AGM Mar 2027 |
Consensus vs. what the filings show
| The market believes | What I found |
|---|---|
| ① Korea's number one in diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals | True — amyloid 94.8%, F-DOPA 100% on 2024 production. But the statistic is annual and the latest available year is 2024; how the field has moved since is not yet verifiable. |
| ② Dementia imaging is effectively a monopoly, so it rises with the new drugs | Half true. Dementia is 21.8% of revenue, while FDG — half of revenue — went from KRW 22.0bn to an annualised 21.7bn. Prescriptions themselves are rising: Leqembi went from 167 scripts in Dec 2024 to 4,362 in Dec 2025. |
| ③ Chapter two is therapeutic CDMO | Still a story. No site has been disclosed; the company's own plan is licensing in 2028, commercial production in 2030. A subsidiary merger and a CTO appointment in July 2026 are preparatory, but the base case carries zero. |
| ④ Unlike loss-making biotech, this one earns | True, but the character of the earnings is changing. Much of the operating gain is the lease accounting shift, and after lease principal free cash flow is KRW 6.5bn, not 11.5bn. |
| ⑤ A growth subsidiary of the Geo-Young group | Geo-Young holds 51.49%; the ultimate controlling entity is MBK Partners. And not one won has ever reached shareholders. |
| What the market has not priced | The prostate cancer tracer is already generating revenue without drug reimbursement (KRW 0.026bn → 0.723bn). It is the only domestic diagnostic used to gate Novartis's Pluvicto prescriptions, and its southern supply network was completed in August 2026. |
What would change the picture: FDG starting to grow again, an expansion actually filed, or a first dividend or share cancellation opening the route to shareholders — any one of the three.
What to check, and when
| Item | Base-case assumption, and what it costs if wrong | Source · timing |
|---|---|---|
| H2 margin seasonality | H2 2026 margin repeats 23.71%. If wrong, 2026E operating profit falls from 82.5 to the mid-60s (−22%). | Q3 2026 report · mid-Nov 2026 |
| FDG volume | 21.67bn (−1.6%) then frozen. Continued decline pulls the revenue ceiling down. | Product revenue · Nov 2026 / Mar 2027 |
| Year-end deferred tax | 22.5% held, recognition excluded. If it repeats as in 2024–25, profit to owners jumps. | Tax note, annual report · Mar 2027 |
| p-tau217 in Korea | Zero impact assumed. Arrival changes the front of the pathway — could add flow or divert it. | MFDS approval listing · ongoing |
| Site lease renewals | 45.8% of nominal lease payments (KRW 7.52bn) mature within a year. Worse terms hit margin directly. | Lease maturity analysis · Mar 2027 |
| Capacity expansion | Frozen at 3,690 batches. Execution releases the utilisation ceiling. | Facility investment / CDMO site disclosure · ongoing |
| Reimbursement decisions | Zero impact assumed. Opening it raises volume and cuts price at the same time. | Drug reimbursement committee agenda · ongoing |
| Lease-adjusted cash generation | 118% pass vs 73.7% borderline after lease repayment — which one is real. | Annual cash flow statement · Mar 2027 |
Three leading indicators — thresholds fixed once registered
| Indicator | Upper | Lower | Frequency · source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amyloid PET share | ≥ 95% | < 90% | Annual · MFDS production statistics |
| Dementia tracer quarterly revenue | ≥ +30% YoY | ≤ +10% | Quarterly · periodic reports |
| Utilisation | ≥ 95% | ≤ 85% | Half-yearly · capacity table |
Optionality held outside the numbers
None of the three below is in any case. They are possibilities, not facts, watched by signal only. Because two are hopes, a third is set against them for symmetry.
The 12 sites that must sit beside hospitals because of half-life get re-read, the moment therapeutic radiopharmaceuticals commercialise, as delivery hubs for cancer therapy rather than factories for diagnostic consumables.
Signal · a therapeutic handling licence or equipment change filed for any one site
If the structure in which Prostacyc gates Pluvicto prescriptions is replicated in other cancers, the company stops being a diagnostics maker and becomes a toll collector.
Signal · further NCCN-listed 18F tracers entering Korea
Blood testing spreads into primary care, amyloid PET shrinks from "confirmation" to "a box ticked for insurance", and then that box is dropped too. The 12 sites remain; there is less to carry.
Signal · Korean Dementia Association guidelines relaxing the PET confirmation requirement
One page — strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats
Only items already stated above; nothing new is added here.
① Amyloid PET 94.8%, F-DOPA 100% (2024 production) ② 12 in-hospital sites plus a dual-licensed distribution network ③ utilisation 75.3% → 94.4% moving together with operating margin 14.3% → 19.3% ④ net cash KRW 13.16bn
① FDG, 51.9% of revenue, at −1.6% ② sites are tenancies, 45.8% of leases maturing within a year ③ no pricing control — the company discloses that it does not compile a price trend ④ zero cash to shareholders ⑤ capacity 4,482 → 3,690 batches with no expansion for three and a half years
① Dementia tracers +38.2% in the half ② Prostacyc 0.026 → 0.723bn with the southern network complete ③ Leqembi scripts 167 → 4,362 ④ volume expansion if reimbursement lands ⑤ therapeutic CDMO (2030 target)
① p-tau217 blood test (Roche, FDA 24 Aug 2026) ② the ceiling of out-of-pocket affordability ③ O-18 raw material +21.9% with pass-through unverifiable ④ two customers at 29.5% whose names are undisclosed ⑤ site lease renewal terms
The strengths are already confirmed in numbers and the threats have not yet happened in Korea — but three of the five weaknesses (FDG stagnation, no pricing control, nothing reaching shareholders) are facts already in motion.
What this report could not do
The weak joints are written down rather than hidden, because a confident-looking gap is the most dangerous failure. Gaps are sorted three ways — ⓐ not disclosed by the company, ⓑ I could not access it, ⓒ not applicable.
| Revenue is effectively a ratio estimate. Unit sales are not disclosed and the batch series is contaminated by the capacity-basis change, so volume × price was impossible; value terms were used instead. | ⓐ |
| The H2 margin rests on a single observation. No half-year split was published for 2024, so a second point could not be built. | ⓐ |
| There is no price series. The company states it does not compile a price trend. O-18 rose 21.9% and there is no public way to check pass-through. | ⓐ |
| Customer names are unknown. Whether the two customers at 29.5% are hospitals or distributors is not in the notes, so concentration cannot be judged as risk or stability. | ⓐ |
| The ceiling could not be cross-checked. Third-party statistics are on a production-value axis while company revenue is on a sales axis, so share cannot be used to bound revenue. Two competitors are private, with no filings — covered by a single share statistic. | ⓒ |
| Documents I could not open: the published credit rating, four amended stock-option filings, and the receipt number of the annual report (18 Mar 2026), where two lookups were blocked. | ⓑ |
| One counter-fact rests on press only. Prostacyc's procedure-level reimbursement (PET-CT procedure evaluation) was reported to have passed in Nov 2025. "Without reimbursement" in this report refers to drug-level reimbursement; the procedure side is not confirmed in filings. | ⓑ · [press] |
| Verification corrections. 2023 utilisation and capacity, and 2022–23 dementia share, were taken directly from the annual report; the H2 2025 margin was reconciled to 23.71% where two figures conflicted. Five carried-forward balance sheet items (equity, assets, cash, lease liabilities, borrowings) mixed separate-basis and prior-period values and were corrected. Conclusions and the three cases did not change. | (record) |
One more admission, about method. Of 12 load-bearing claims put through falsification, none collapsed — not because they are unbreakable, but because 7 of the 12 are forward-looking propositions that present facts cannot refute. Only two were scorable on present facts; both were on the headwind side and both survived.
Omitted stages. This report does not price the company and does not audit such a price, because it carries no valuation.
Sources
Primary · regulatory filings (all figures in the text)
| Half-year report (14 Aug 2026) — consolidated statements, lease note 11, revenue note 22, expenses by nature note 23, dividends | 20260814002701 |
| Annual report (18 Mar 2026) — consolidated statements, tax note 18, product and customer revenue, capacity and output, raw material prices, price trend section | [not confirmed] — lookup blocked |
| Material report, merger decision (22 Jul 2026) — absorption of Radio D&S Labs, effective 2 Oct 2026, plus two amendments (23 Jul 2026) | 20260722000193 · 20260723000044 · 20260723000547 |
| 30%+ change in earnings structure (29 Jan 2026) and its amendment (10 Mar 2026) | 20260129900282 · 20260310900615 |
| Material management disclosure (18 Dec 2025) — FES approval | 20251218900498 |
| Large shareholding report, short form (31 Aug 2026) · record date setting (22 Jul 2026) | 20260831001517 · 20260722900373 |
| MFDS annual production statistics (cited in periodic reports, 2024 basis) | (cited) |
Secondary · press and institutional releases
| FDA clearance for Elecsys pTau217 — patients 55+ with cognitive decline; first single-biomarker blood test supporting rule-in/rule-out in both primary and specialist care | Roche Diagnostics · 24 Aug 2026 · link |
| Fourth FDA-cleared blood biomarker test, and the second within a week | Alzheimer's Association · 24 Aug 2026 · link |
| Leqembi prescriptions up 27× in a year — DUR data, 167 in Dec 2024 → 4,362 in Dec 2025 | Electronic Times · 23 Jan 2026 · link |
| Leqembi cost-effectiveness — an SNU pharmacy research team finds reimbursement would need a price cut above 80% | Dementia News · 21 Aug 2025 · link |
| Calls to reimburse PET and CSF testing — amyloid PET costs about KRW 1m in Korea; the dementia society's request for at least one reimbursed scan has not been accepted | Medical News · 6 Nov 2025 · link |
| 7th 2026 drug reimbursement committee results — five items reviewed, Leqembi absent | HIRA · 2 Jul 2026 · link |
| Prostacyc southern (Yeongnam, Jeolla) supply network completed | Edaily · 4 Aug 2026 · link |
| Radio D&S Labs merger and CTO appointment | Hankyung · 23 Jul 2026 · link |
| Japan's handling of Leqembi and Kisunla — prescriptions did not immediately rise on reimbursement, and an out-of-pocket cap was applied alongside | Yakup · date [not confirmed] · link |
One conflict between sources. The Korean approval timing for Kisunla (donanemab) is disputed: the company's annual report says "applied Dec 2025, approval expected end-2026", while press reports argue that domestic phase 3 bridging data will take considerably longer. Neither is treated as settled; it is logged as a checkpoint.
Appendix — key figures on one page
Largest shareholder Geo-Young Co. 51.49% (14,669,130 shares); ultimate controlling entity MBK Partners. Shares outstanding [not confirmed] — the disclosed figure was not obtained and no back-calculation from the stake was performed. Potential dilution: 244,500 stock options outstanding (172,500 exercisable), new-share type. No convertible bonds, warrants, RCPS or exchangeable bonds. Non-controlling interest nil throughout 2023–H1 2026. Subsidiary merger: Radio D&S Labs, small-scale, no new shares, effective 2 Oct 2026.
12 production sites — Yonsei, Eulji, Hanyang, Chilgok Kyungpook, Gangnam Severance, Daejeon St. Mary's, Gangnam RP (Samsung Seoul), Dong-A Busan, Ajou, Yeungnam, Busan Paik, Kangwon — all inside hospitals. Eight approved products: FDG, FP-CIT, Vizamyl, F-DOPA, FACBC, NaF, Prostacyc (22 Jul 2025), FES (18 Dec 2025). Three out-licences: Taiwan PPhBio (31 Mar 2025, USD 105,000; 30,000 upfront + 25,000 first milestone received), China DC/AMS (2019–2033, USD 550,000, nothing received), Australia Cyclotek (2017). Overseas sales KRW 176.6m in the half — 0.8% of total.
| Actuals (KRW 100m) | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 346.9 | 356.0 | 385.7 | 209.0 |
| Operating profit | 52.6 | 50.8 | 74.4 | 31.9 |
| Net profit to owners | 40.0 | 79.9 | 64.8 | 20.8 |
| Operating cash flow | 84.4 | 70.3 | 99.4 | 76.9 |
| Capex | 11.5 | 15.9 | 8.7 | 1.49 |
Balance sheet, 30 Jun 2026 — total assets 776.0 · total equity 515.7 · cash 190.3 · borrowings 58.6 · lease liabilities 148.8 · net cash 131.6. Estimated revenue is 422.1 in each of 2026E, 2027E and 2028E: measured H1 plus the prior-year half for 2026, then held flat for want of new evidence. No other figure is derived from that table.
DISCLOSURE
This is one individual's analysis based on publicly filed disclosures. It is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security and is not investment advice. The author is not a licensed investment firm or adviser and provides no individual consultation.
This report presents no fair value and no target price.
All data are drawn from regulatory filings and other sources believed reliable, but accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed. Estimates reflect the author's assumptions, may differ from outcomes, and are stated as of the cut-off date. Investment decisions and their consequences belong to the investor; loss of principal is possible. This document cannot be used as evidence in determining legal liability.
Filings and results after 1 September 2026 are not reflected. The report is written for public information purposes, with no intent to damage any company's reputation or interfere with its business; facts and the author's interpretation are separated in the text. The author analysed the business and the direction of earnings before looking at the market's short-term assessment.
The author does not hold the security discussed (as of 1 September 2026). Trading in it may occur after publication without prior notice.
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