SK Innovation _ Where 89% of the first-half profit came from, and where that profit went
SK Innovation
Where 89% of the first-half profit came from,
and where that profit went
※ As of 2 September 2026 · All KRW figures converted at US$1 = KRW 1,400
Operating profit for the first half of 2026 was KRW 5,649.5bn (US$4.04bn). What remained as net profit for the group was KRW 969.6bn (US$693m) — of which the owners of the parent held KRW 1,179.4bn (US$842m).
This note follows what happened between those two numbers, using the primary filings: the Annual Report (DART receipt no. 20260316000827) and the Semi-Annual Report (receipt no. 20260814002500).
※ All four figures are from the Semi-Annual Report (receipt no. 20260814002500). Net profit is consolidated net profit. Net debt is calculated by the author as total borrowings plus lease liabilities, less cash equivalents and short-term financial instruments.
- This is a personal analysis based on publicly available regulatory filings. It does not recommend the purchase or sale of any security, nor does it constitute investment advice. The author is not a licensed financial investment business operator or investment adviser, and does not provide individual consultations.
- All data and figures are drawn from sources believed to be reliable, including electronic regulatory filings, but their accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed. Estimates reflect the author's assumptions and may differ from actual outcomes. All figures are stated as of the reference date given in the text.
- The analysis sets aside short-term market assessments and looks first at the company's core competitiveness and the direction of its fundamentals.
- Investment decisions and their consequences rest with the investor. Loss of principal is possible. This material may not be used as evidence in any determination of legal liability.
- Filings and results published after the reference date are not reflected. The author does not hold the security discussed in this note (as of the reference date). The author may, however, buy or sell it after publication without prior notice.
- The critical analysis in this report is a subjective opinion offered in the public interest — for investors' right to know and for the sharing of information. It is not intended to damage the reputation of any company or to interfere with its business.
Six lines
H1 operating profit of KRW 5,649.5bn (US$4.04bn) — 89% of it came from Energy & Chemicals
Broken down by segment: Energy & Chemicals KRW 5,053.6bn (US$3.61bn), E&S KRW 386.6bn (US$276m), Battery & Materials KRW 338.0bn (US$241m), Other −KRW 128.8bn (−US$92m). In the same period a year earlier, the group as a whole posted an operating loss of KRW 432.3bn (US$309m).
Below operating profit, KRW 4,679.9bn (US$3.34bn) fell away — leaving net profit of KRW 969.6bn
In the second quarter alone, operating profit was KRW 3,487.3bn (US$2.49bn) and net profit KRW 73.5bn (US$52m). Derivative valuation losses, asset impairments and income tax accounted for the gap. According to the company's own filing, most of the derivative loss was an unrealised valuation loss on a price return swap (PRS), with no cash leaving the company. [COMPANY-STATED]
The warning the company attached itself — "turns to a loss when crude prices fall"
Second-quarter refining operating profit was KRW 651.2bn (US$465m), down KRW 632.0bn (US$451m) from the previous quarter. The company stated that the business "turned to a loss in June." Annualising the first-half numbers as they stand would be unwise.
SK On turned a profit of KRW 821.8bn (US$587m) — output rose, but the utilisation rate fell
Annualising first-half battery output gives a figure 6.4% above the prior year. Average utilisation, however, fell from 48.7% to 36.4%. Why the two measures diverge is taken up in the main text.
Net debt stands at KRW 26.1tn (US$18.66bn); the debt-to-equity ratio at 169.7%
Total borrowings including leases fell from KRW 41,181.8bn (US$29.42bn) at the end of 2025 to KRW 39,712.0bn (US$28.37bn) at the end of June. How the reduction was achieved matters, though — debt repaid out of operations and debt shed by handing over assets are different things.
Three variables lie ahead — ESS delivery timing, government price regulation, and the SKIET merger
Orders for ESS (energy storage systems) have grown, but most convert to revenue only from 2027. Layered on top are a policy variable — the petroleum product price ceiling — and the absorption merger of SKIET (merger date 1 January 2027).
Where the profit came from
The notes to the Semi-Annual Report set out operating profit by segment in full.
| Segment | H1 2026 | H1 2025 | FY 2025 | H1 2026 (US$m) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy & Chemicals | 5,053.6 | −147.6 | 1,119.9 | 3,610 |
| E&S | 386.6 | 308.1 | 681.1 | 276 |
| Battery & Materials | 338.0 | −474.2 | −1,165.1 | 241 |
| Other | −128.8 | −118.5 | −187.2 | −92 |
| Total | 5,649.5 | −432.3 | 448.7 | 4,035 |
※ Source: Semi-Annual Report note 31 (receipt no. 20260814002500) and Annual Report note 36 (receipt no. 20260316000827). H1 2025 is restated to exclude discontinued operations. US$ converted at 1,400.
The reading is this. 89% of first-half profit came from a single segment, Energy & Chemicals. Battery returned to profit, but at KRW 338.0bn (US$241m) that is 6% of group profit. When the merger was announced in November 2024, the picture the company presented was that "the volatility of petrochemicals would be tempered by the stable earnings of LNG and power generation." This first-half result was made in the opposite direction — on the volatile side.
| Company | Revenue | Operating profit | QoQ | Op. profit (US$m) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SK Energy (refining) | 13,210.6 | 651.2 | −632.0 | 465 |
| SK Enmove (lubricants) | 1,983.1 | 691.9 | +503.4 | 494 |
| SK On (battery) | 2,946.0 | 821.8 | +1,171.0 | 587 |
| SK Geo Centric (chemicals) | 3,733.1 | 43.7 | −83.9 | 31 |
| SK Earthon (E&P) | 75.4 | 29.9 | — | 21 |
| SKIET (separators) | 39.5 | −63.4 | — | −45 |
※ As announced by the company (consolidated preliminary results disclosure, receipt no. 20260730800524). Some subsidiaries are missing from this table, so the sum (KRW 2,175.1bn) does not match consolidated operating profit of KRW 3,487.3bn. SK Incheon Petrochem and SK On Trading International are among those omitted; SK Incheon Petrochem's Q2 figure in particular was reported inconsistently across outlets and has been excluded (its Q1 figure was KRW 647.1bn). SK On's "merged-entity basis operating profit of KRW 1,826.9bn" is not shown alongside, because the scope of that calculation cannot be verified from the filings.
Does this profit repeat?
Inventory gains come back the other way
The most precise description of the first quarter came from the company itself. Disclosing an inventory-related gain of KRW 780.0bn (US$557m) at SK Energy, it stated that this "turns to a loss should crude prices fall." [COMPANY-STATED] The gain arises from the lag between buying crude and selling product.
The second quarter showed that direction in practice. Refining operating profit fell KRW 632.0bn (US$451m) in a single quarter, and the Q2 inventory-related gain was about KRW 560.0bn (US$400m). The company explained it this way — April and May brought gains as crude prices rose, but prices fell towards the quarter end and the business turned to a loss in June; in a falling-price period, expensive crude flows into cost with a lag, and inventory valuation losses can follow.
Part of the revenue increase came from a change in presentation
In this Semi-Annual Report the company changed one accounting presentation.
Amounts under the US Inflation Reduction Act's Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (AMPC), previously presented as "other operating revenue" separately from revenue, are merged into revenue from this half and presented as "revenue and other operating revenue."
The reason the company gave is that, as its entry into the US ESS market gathered pace, customers began reflecting the credit in unit price negotiations. [COMPANY-STATED] For reference, other operating revenue was KRW 718.6bn (US$513m) in 2025 and KRW 292.4bn (US$209m) in 2024. Part of the revenue growth therefore came not from the business but from the change in presentation, and should be read with that in mind.
First-half "other revenue" was KRW 1,824.7bn (US$1.30bn), of which KRW 1,304.3bn (US$932m) fell in the second quarter. The company noted that this line contains AMPC, derivative gains and compensation received from a customer. Press reports put that compensation at "around KRW 1tn," but the actual amount is not separated in the filings and cannot be verified. What can be verified is that total Q2 other revenue (KRW 1,304.3bn / US$932m) exceeds SK On's Q2 operating profit (KRW 821.8bn / US$587m).
Between operating profit and net profit
However large operating profit may be, without looking at what happens below it you have only half the picture.
| Step | KRW bn | US$m | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating profit | 3,487.3 | 2,491 | |
| Finance income | +858.7 | +613 | |
| Finance costs | −2,394.2 | −1,710 | Mostly derivatives and FX |
| Equity-method gains | +37.3 | +27 | |
| Other non-operating income | +323.9 | +231 | |
| Other non-operating expenses | −1,743.4 | −1,245 | Impairment 881.0 + held-for-sale valuation loss 580.1 |
| Profit before tax | 569.7 | 407 | |
| Income tax | −521.1 | −372 | |
| Profit from continuing ops | 48.6 | 35 | |
| Discontinued operations | +24.9 | +18 | |
| Quarterly net profit | 73.5 | 52 | Owners of parent 215.0 / NCI −141.6 |
| Item | KRW bn | US$m |
|---|---|---|
| Operating profit | 5,649.5 | 4,035 |
| Net derivative loss | −1,827.4 | −1,305 |
| Net interest burden | −589.6 | −421 |
| Net FX loss | −91.2 | −65 |
| PP&E impairment | −890.8 | −636 |
| Held-for-sale valuation loss | −580.1 | −414 |
| Held-for-sale disposal gain | +313.3 | +224 |
| Other, net | +20.9 | +15 |
| Profit before tax | 1,964.6 | 1,403 |
| Income tax | −1,018.5 | −728 |
| Net profit | 969.6 | 693 |
The largest single item is the net derivative loss of KRW 1,827.4bn (US$1.31bn). First-half derivative gains were KRW 2,177.7bn (US$1.56bn) and losses KRW 4,005.1bn (US$2.86bn).
The company disclosed the nature of this loss separately.
"Occurrence of loss on derivative transactions" (receipt no. 20260730800569, 30 July 2026)
The type of derivative is stated as price return swap (PRS) and others, and the loss amount as KRW 1,216.9bn (US$869m), equal to 3.34% of equity. The company gave the cause as recognising "a non-operating loss, not accompanied by any cash outflow, from fair-value measurement in connection with the PRS contract," and stated that "the loss is for the most part an unrealised valuation loss, and there is accordingly no actual cash outflow." [COMPANY-STATED]
| Item | KRW bn | US$m |
|---|---|---|
| Derivative transaction gains | +12.4 | +9 |
| Derivative valuation gains | +13.7 | +10 |
| Derivative transaction losses | −10.1 | −7 |
| Derivative valuation losses | −1,232.9 | −881 |
| Total | −1,216.9 | −869 |
Almost all of the loss is a valuation loss. It did not arise from hedging crude or currency exposure; it is the result of remeasuring a share-price-linked contract at period-end prices. This PRS is the same instrument that appears in Finding 07, in the SKIET merger.
Two things are worth recording together. First, as the company states, no cash left the business on account of this loss. Second, net profit in the income statement is nonetheless reduced by that amount. And because the PRS must be settled in the course of the SKIET merger, the possibility of cash moving later remains open.
The difference between the consolidated net derivative loss (KRW 1,827.4bn / US$1.31bn) and the disclosed amount (KRW 1,216.9bn / US$869m) appears to reflect a difference in scope, but this is not separately confirmed in the filings.
Tax is also worth noting. Against first-half pre-tax profit of KRW 1,964.6bn (US$1.40bn), income tax was KRW 1,018.5bn (US$728m) — an effective rate of 51.8%. For the second quarter alone, pre-tax profit was KRW 569.7bn and tax KRW 521.1bn. This pattern is common where profits and losses diverge across overseas entities.
The numbers improved considerably
| Consolidated | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 | H1 2026 (US$m) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 76,755.7 | 74,269.6 | 80,296.1 | 53,448.2 | 38,177 |
| Operating profit | 1,880.6 | 355.7 | 448.7 | 5,649.5 | 4,035 |
| Continuing operations | 552.7 | −2,302.3 | −4,913.8 | 946.1 | 676 |
| Discontinued operations | 2.2 | −70.2 | −522.6 | 23.5 | 17 |
| Net profit | 554.9 | −2,372.5 | −5,436.4 | 969.6 | 693 |
| Owners of the parent | 256.3 | −2,260.0 | −3,347.9 | 1,179.4 | 842 |
| Debt-to-equity | 169.3% | 178.8% | 190.2% | 169.7% | — |
| Interest coverage | — | 0.24x | 0.29x | 6.95x | — |
※ H1 2026 revenue is "revenue and other operating revenue." Interest coverage is calculated by the author as operating profit ÷ interest expense (including interest on other financial liabilities); the H1 figure is the ratio of first-half operating profit to first-half interest expense. The 2023 figures are restated to exclude discontinued operations and therefore differ from the numbers reported at the time.
| Item | End 2025 | End Jun 2026 | Jun 2026 (US$bn) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Short-term borrowings | 7,201.7 | 8,037.5 | 5.74 |
| Current portion of long-term debt | 8,889.7 | 6,899.5 | 4.93 |
| Bonds and long-term borrowings | 22,764.5 | 22,316.1 | 15.94 |
| Lease liabilities | 2,325.9 | 2,459.0 | 1.76 |
| Total borrowings | 41,181.8 | 39,712.0 | 28.37 |
| Cash and short-term instruments | 16,344.9 | 13,593.3 | 9.71 |
| Net debt | 24,836.9 | 26,118.7 | 18.66 |
Here the direction splits. Total borrowings fell by KRW 1,469.8bn (US$1.05bn), while net debt rose by KRW 1,281.8bn (US$916m). Cash fell by KRW 2,751.6bn (US$1.97bn). The debt came down, and the cash reserve came down with it.
Interest coverage jumped from 0.29x to 6.95x. But if the cause of the improvement is the oil price, the improvement returns with the oil price.
How the debt came down
On 9 December 2025 the company signed an agreement with Ford Motor Company to end their joint venture. The structure was as follows.
- The assets and liabilities of the Kentucky plants 1 and 2 transferred to Ford
- Ford's stake in the joint venture was cancelled → SK On's holding rose from 50% to 100%
- Renamed in May 2026 (BlueOval SK → SK On Tennessee)
In other words, Kentucky was handed over and Tennessee taken in full. At its results briefing the company stated that the transaction would reduce borrowings by about KRW 5,400bn (US$3.86bn). [COMPANY-STATED] In the same quarter, however, it recognised asset impairments of about KRW 4,200bn (US$3.00bn), and was reticent about whether further losses would follow.
Debt repaid out of operations and debt shed by transferring assets and raising capital are different in kind. Keeping that distinction is important.
Orders rose; utilisation fell
| Contract | Volume | Delivery | Value | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flatiron (US) | 1GWh firm (+6.2GWh first-refusal) | H2 2026 – 4 yrs | Undisclosed | Signed |
| NeoVolta Power (US) | 9GWh | 2027–2031 | Est. KRW 1,500bn (US$1.07bn) | Signed 27 Aug 2026 |
| NeoVolta Power, additional (tolling) | 9GWh | TBD | TBD | Not signed · targeted this year |
| Korea 2nd ESS central contract market | 284MW (50.3% of total) | 2027 onwards | — | Awarded Feb 2026 |
The target set at the start of the year was more than 20GWh of global ESS orders; on firm volumes, close to half has been filled. On the EV side, batteries for Ford's new EREV (extended-range electric vehicle) model are to be produced at the Tennessee plant, with commercial production scheduled for 2028.
A limit worth noting — SK On's battery order backlog cannot be verified from the filings. The Semi-Annual Report states that there are "no order contracts for which revenue is recognised on a percentage-of-completion basis using the cost input method." The volumes and values in the table above come entirely from company announcements and press reports, with no filing against which to check them.
There are traces in the filings, however. Under contingent liabilities, performance guarantees are recorded in connection with SK Battery America's ESS supply contracts — to Reven Storage LLC (limit US$44m) and Fe Taft LLC (limit US$197m). ESS supply relationships therefore existed before NeoVolta Power.
Output and utilisation point in opposite directions
| Battery business | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maximum capacity (GWh/yr) | 71.5 | 94.6 | 94.3 |
| Output (thousand cells) | 121,488 | 168,230 | 89,475 |
| Annualised | 121,488 | 168,230 | 178,950 |
| Average utilisation | 43.8% | 48.7% | 36.4% |
※ Capacity, output and utilisation are from the Semi-Annual Report (receipt no. 20260814002500). The annualisation (first-half output × 2) is the author's calculation. Utilisation = load hours ÷ operating hours; the company changed the calculation method in this report and applied it retrospectively to prior figures. HSBMA (the Hyundai Motor Group joint venture) and Beijing BESK are accounted for as joint ventures and are excluded from capacity. Kentucky plant 1 (3.1GWh) was included in 2025 and excluded in 2026 following its disposal.
The two measures point in opposite directions.
- Output, annualised from the first half, is 6.4% higher than the prior year.
- Utilisation fell from 48.7% to 36.4% — down 12.3 percentage points.
Because the denominator of utilisation is operating hours and the numerator load hours, planned downtime — such as conversion work for ESS lines — pushes the measure down regardless of output. The removal of the Kentucky plant also affects the two measures differently. It is therefore a stretch to read the fall in utilisation as "plants standing idle," and equally a stretch to read the rise in output as "volume created the profit."
What is certain lies on the side of the company's own account of the swing to profit. It cited higher sales in Asia, customer compensation, increased AMPC and cost reduction — and did not lead with volume growth.
| Quarter | Revenue | Operating profit | Op. profit (US$m) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 2025 | 1,457.2 | −441.4 | −315 |
| Q1 2026 | 1,791.2 | −349.2 | −249 |
| Q2 2026 | 2,946.0 | +821.8 | +587 |
| H1 total | 4,737.2 | +472.6 | +338 |
Ahead — the company and the market diverge
| The view | Basis | |
|---|---|---|
| Company [STATED] | Profitability sustained in H2 | Continued cost reduction, ESS line conversion, "improvement even excluding one-offs" |
| Market (early Aug) | FY2026 operating profit around KRW 150.0bn (US$107m) | Against H1 profit of KRW 472.6bn, this implies a H2 loss of about KRW 320.0bn (US$229m) |
That gap is the central question for this company at present.
Timing matters alongside it. The head of financial management stated that, because most domestic ESS volumes are for delivery from 2027, they will contribute to revenue and operating profit from 2027. [COMPANY-STATED] The NeoVolta Power contract also begins in 2027. Most firm orders therefore barely touch second-half 2026 results.
Scale is worth gauging too. Taking NeoVolta Power's 9GWh at the industry estimate of KRW 1,500bn (US$1.07bn) and dividing over five years gives roughly KRW 300bn (US$214m) a year. Set against SK On's first-half revenue of KRW 4,737.2bn simply doubled (around KRW 9,500bn / US$6.79bn), that is about 3% — though the denominator includes one-off items such as the Q2 compensation, so the real contribution may be larger. Either way, it is better read as filling empty lines than as changing the board.
The price the government holds
Under "events after the reporting period" in the Semi-Annual Report (receipt no. 20260814002500) there is this item.
The company supplies products under the petroleum product maximum price system established by Article 23 of the Petroleum and Petroleum Substitute Fuel Business Act. On 1 July 2026 the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the "Regulation on Fiscal Support for Compensation of Losses Arising from the Designation of Maximum Petroleum Sales Prices," and the company intends to calculate costs for the settlement period and apply to the government. The amount of fiscal support will be determined following deliberation by the Maximum Price Settlement Committee.
Put plainly: the government caps the selling price of refined products, and compensates the resulting losses after the fact. Every other judgement in this note rests on the premise that crude prices drive earnings — and that premise now has a policy valve attached to it.
Two cautions. First, the compensation amount is determined only after committee deliberation, so its size is presently unknown. Second, the system works to cap the upside of earnings when crude prices rise. That is one more reason not to extend first-half profit forward as it stands.
The SKIET absorption merger
On 25 August 2026 the boards of both companies approved the merger (material report on merger decision, receipt no. 20260825000424). As this came after the Semi-Annual Report was filed on 14 August, it is not yet reflected in the disclosed financial statements.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Structure | SK Innovation absorbs SKIET (SKIET ceases to exist) |
| Merger ratio | 1 : 0.1174540 |
| Procedure | Small-scale merger for SK Innovation (board resolution in place of shareholder meeting; no appraisal rights) / ordinary merger for SKIET |
| Schedule | Approval 24 Nov → merger date 1 Jan 2027 → new shares listed 18 Jan |
| Stated reason | SKIET's continuing losses and limited short-term funding capacity |
SKIET's second-quarter results were revenue of KRW 39.5bn (US$28m) and an operating loss of KRW 63.4bn (US$45m). Revenue fell 52% year on year.
The passage worth watching is what the company said at its briefing about the treatment of the PRS (price return swap). It stated that it had "not discussed the matter with PRS investors in advance, and regards exit through the exercise of appraisal rights as the most likely scenario, and will prepare the necessary funds accordingly." [COMPANY-STATED] In other words, a cash outflow of undetermined size remains outstanding.
In accounting terms, SKIET is already consolidated, so consolidated operating profit does not change. But the non-controlling interest disappears, and so the losses of the separator business pass in full to the owners of the parent.
Where the market divides
Views from the brokerage community point in different directions. Rather than reproducing individual reports, what follows sets out only the points on which they divide.
The cautious view rests on two points. One is that even if crude prices rise, the distance from there to higher EV demand and then to SK On's results is considerable. The other is that ESS remains an expectation rather than a result. The second point meets what this note has verified — most firm orders begin in 2027.
The positive view weighs the prospect of further ESS orders. It treats entry into the US market as progress in itself, and holds that recovery may follow once the volatile stretch has passed.
The conditional view holds that further improvement requires four things together: narrower battery losses, more ESS orders, lower net debt, and SKIET normalisation. Those four overlap precisely with the items covered in this note.
※ The above summarises only the points of divergence among brokerage views as quoted in press reports. Individual reports' investment opinions and target prices are not covered.
What would break this picture
| Risk | Detail | Character |
|---|---|---|
| Crude price reversal | As the company states, inventory-related gains turn to losses when crude prices fall. The turn to a loss already appeared in June. | Confirmed · ongoing |
| Size of non-operating items | KRW 4,679.9bn (US$3.34bn) fell away below operating profit in the first half. Most of the derivative loss is a PRS valuation loss with no cash outflow, but the settlement burden in the SKIET merger remains separately outstanding. | Confirmed |
| SK On one-offs falling away | Third-quarter results, without customer compensation and AMPC, are the real measure of underlying strength. | Q3 will decide |
| ESS revenue lag | Most firm orders begin in 2027 and barely touch second-half results. | Timing |
| Price regulation | The petroleum product price ceiling and government compensation. The amount is fixed only after committee deliberation. | External · size unknown |
| SKIET merger | Separator losses pass to the owners of the parent, and PRS settlement funding remains undetermined. | Ongoing |
| Falling cash | Total borrowings fell, but cash fell further, so net debt rose. | Structural |
Events after the reporting period
These are the items recorded in the Semi-Annual Report (receipt no. 20260814002500) for the period after end-June. A pattern of continued asset tidying is visible.
| Date | Detail |
|---|---|
| 10 Jul | Resolution for KRW 200.0bn (US$143m) short-term borrowing, one-year maturity (for investment in other entities and debt repayment) |
| 22 Jul | Acquisition of 100% of Coil BESS Ltd., an ESS construction and operating company (KRW 1.29bn / US$0.9m) |
| 23 Jul | Additional investment of US$143.4m in SK hynix NAND Product Solutions |
| 30 Jul | Resolution to invest KRW 331.0bn (US$236m) in Yongin Cogeneration (provisional name), with transfer of related construction-in-progress |
| 30 Jul | Participation in SK China's disproportionate capital reduction → holding falls 33.4% → 10.2% |
| 30 Jul | Participation in SK South East Asia Investment's capital reduction → holding falls 40.0% → 25.0% |
| 31 Jul | Decision to sell the occupancy rights to the Chemical Recycling plant site (KRW 103.4bn / US$74m) |
| 25 Aug | Board resolution on the SKIET absorption merger |
Under discontinued operations, the disposal of three entities — SK Primacor Americas, SK Primacor Europe and SK Functional Polymer — is in progress.
What this note does not do
- It does not calculate a fair value or a target price. Share price, market capitalisation and target prices are not covered. Looking at the business itself is the purpose of this note.
- SK On's order backlog is not subject to disclosure and could not be verified.
- The actual amount of customer compensation, and which businesses the asset impairments relate to, are not separated in the filings and could not be confirmed.
- How derivative gains and losses offset against physical transactions cannot be determined from the filings alone.
- Some subsidiary results announced by the company (SK Incheon Petrochem, Q2) were reported inconsistently across outlets and have been excluded from the table; as a result the table's sum differs from the consolidated figure.
- It reaches no conclusion as to whether things are getting better or worse.
Sources
| # | Document | Receipt no. | Filed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Annual Report (Dec 2025) | 20260316000827 | 2026.03.16 |
| 2 | Semi-Annual Report (Jun 2026) | 20260814002500 | 2026.08.14 |
| 3 | Occurrence of loss on derivative transactions | 20260730800569 | 2026.07.30 |
| 4 | Consolidated preliminary results (Q2) | 20260730800524 | 2026.07.30 |
| 5 | Material report on merger decision — SKIET | 20260825000424 | 2026.08.25 |
| 6 | Securities registration statement (merger) | 20260826000056 | 2026.08.26 |
| 7 | Quarterly Report (Mar 2026) | 20260515001455 | 2026.05.15 |
| 8 | Consolidated preliminary results (Q1) | 20260513801240 | 2026.05.13 |
※ Sections principally relied on — summary financial information; consolidated statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive income; segment information (semi-annual note 31, annual note 36); bonds and borrowings (semi-annual note 15); finance income and costs (semi-annual note 26, annual note 28); other non-operating income and expenses; held-for-sale classification (note 34); discontinued operations (note 35); events after the reporting period (note 36); production facilities, output and utilisation; sales and order status; contingent liabilities and commitments.
- Electronic Times — Q1 results and subsidiary figures (13 May 2026)
- Money Today — Q2 results (30 Jul 2026)
- Digital Daily — Q2 results by subsidiary (30 Jul 2026)
- Aju Business Daily — Q2 earnings call, June loss (30 Jul 2026)
- ZDNet Korea — Q4 results, impairment, Ford transaction (28 Jan 2026)
- ZDNet Korea — H1 utilisation across the three battery makers, Seosan ESS conversion (15 Aug 2026)
- Money Today — NeoVolta Power 9GWh contract (1 Sep 2026)
- Herald Business — NeoVolta Power contract, domestic ESS tender (31 Aug 2026)
- Edaily — NeoVolta Power contract detail (31 Aug 2026)
- Korea Financial Economy Daily — Flatiron, 2027 contribution comment (14 May 2026)
- HuffPost Korea — SK On FY2026 operating profit outlook (4 Aug 2026)
- TheElec — SKIET merger briefing call, PRS treatment (Aug 2026)
- EBN — SKIET merger terms and schedule (25 Aug 2026)
- Wikitree — SKIET Q2 results (25 Aug 2026)
※ Straight News (13 May 2026, SK Energy inventory-related gain of KRW 780.0bn) is listed by name only, as the link could not be confirmed. Brokerage views were referred to only as points of divergence; no individual report has been reproduced.
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